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Abstract—In this paper, we consider a multi-input multi-
output (MIMO) non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA) net-
work consisting of one source and two legitimate users (LUs),
so-called near and far users according to their distances to
the source, and one passive eavesdropper, over Nakagami-m
fading channels. Specifically, we investigate the cases where
the signals of the far user might or might not be successfully
decoded at the eavesdropper and the near user. Thus, we aim to
design a transmit antenna selection (TAS) secure communication
protocol for the network; where, two TAS solutions, namely
Solutions I and II, are proposed. Specifically, solutions I and
II focus on maximizing the received signal power between the
source and the near user, and between the source and the far
user, respectively. Accordingly, exact and asymptotic closed-form
expressions for the secrecy outage probability of the LUs and the
overall system are derived. Our analytical results corroborated
by Monte Carlo simulation indicate that the secrecy performance
could be significantly improved by properly selecting the power
allocation coefficients and increasing the number of antennas at
the source and the LUs. Interestingly, solution II is shown to
provide a better overall secrecy performance over solution I.
Index Terms—Transmit antenna selection, MIMO, non-
orthorgonal multiple access, physical layer security.
I. INTRODUCTION
Non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA) has been recently
considered as a promising solution for the next generation of
wireless communication networks (i.e., 5G) to improve the
spectral efficiency and user fairness [1], [2]. The principle of
NOMA relies on utilizing the power domain to serve multiple
users at the same time/frequency/code [2]. Specifically, in a
NOMA network with more than two users, a base station (BS)
transmits the superimposed messages with different power
levels to the users [3], [4]. The power allocation is carried
out based on the users’ channel conditions. At the receiver
side, successive interference cancellation (SIC), a multiuser
data detection technique, is performed to decode the messages.
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In principle, first, a user detects the messages of other users
having weaker channel conditions and then removes them from
observation. Second, the user then decodes its own messages
by treating the messages of the other users (i.e., the users
with stronger channel conditions) as noise. It becomes evi-
dent that NOMA can significantly reduce the multiple access
interference at an affordable complexity cost [5]. Further, in
comparison with conventional multiple access schemes such
as orthogonal frequency-division multiple access (OFDMA)
[1], [6], NOMA can provide better user fairness because the
users with weak channel conditions are allocated more power.
With the development of wireless networks, information
security is a critical challenge due to the broadcast nature of
wireless transmissions [7], [8]. Recently, physical layer secu-
rity (PLS) has been emerging as a prominent candidate for im-
proving the secrecy performance of wireless systems [9]–[11].
The key idea of PLS relies on exploiting the characteristics
of wireless channels to guarantee secure communications [8].
This approach is different from traditional security solutions,
such as cryptographic protocols in the upper layers [12]. In
PLS, it is well-known that the perfect secrecy is achieved
when the quality of the legitimate channel is higher than that
of illegitimate channel [7]–[11]. To obtain further significant
improvements, many PLS-based transmission methods have
been proposed, based on the applications of multi-input multi-
output (MIMO) [13], artificial noises [14], jamming [15], or
beamforming techniques [16].
Nowadays, PLS of NOMA systems is becoming an in-
teresting topic [17]–[21]. In [17], the secrecy sum rate of
a single-input single-output (SISO) NOMA system has been
studied and the closed-form optimal solution for the power
allocation has been derived, based on the users’ quality of
service (QoS) requirements. Taking the PLS of large-scale
NOMA networks into account, [18] has employed stochastic
geometry methods to locate users and eavesdroppers in the
system. Furthermore, a protected zone around the source
has been introduced to enhance the information security. To
characterize the secrecy performance of the proposed system,
new exact and asymptotic expressions of the secrecy outage
probability (SOP) have been derived. In [19], the application of
multiple antennas, artificial noises (AN) and a protected zone
to NOMA in large-scale networks have been studied for the
purpose of improving the secrecy performance. The obtained
results regarding the secrecy outage probability indicated that
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2a significant secrecy performance gain could be achieved by
generating the AN at the BS and invoking the protected zone.
In addition, the PLS in a two-user multi-input single-output
(MISO) NOMA system was examined in [20] where NOMA
is performed based on the users’ QoS requirements, instead of
their channel conditions. In this context, the authors considered
a scenario that the eavesdropper detects two-user data using
SIC. Specifically, it first treats the message of the user with
low QoS as noise to decode the message of the user with high
QoS, and then subtracts this component from its observation
before decoding the message of the other user. Moreover,
the use of a transmit antenna selection (TAS) scheme for
improving secrecy performance was considered. Besides, with
a multi-antenna source, using TAS can help to improve the
power efficiency which is a critically important issue to reduce
the burden of electrical grids in practice [22]. In [21], a
new secrecy beamforming (SBF) scheme for MISO NOMA
systems was studied. Specifically, the proposed SBF scheme
efficiently exploited AN to protect the confidential information
of two NOMA assisted legitimate users (LUs). It is clear that
the TAS technique has been demonstrated as a low-complexity
and power-efficient solution for secure NOMA networks [20],
[23].
Nevertheless, previous works on PLS in NOMA systems
[17]–[21] have not covered the following issues. First, they
have considered the scenario of SISO or MISO systems with
Rayleigh fading channels. Thus, the applications of MIMO
which can significantly improve the secrecy performance and
the consideration of Nakagami-m fading channel, a more gen-
eral scenario, have not been addressed yet. Second, the works
[17]–[19] have been carried out under the ideal assumptions
as follows: (i) the strong user always successfully decodes the
message of the weak user, and (ii) the eavesdroppers have pow-
erful detection abilities to distinguish a multi-user data stream
without the interference, generated by superposed transmit sig-
nals (i.e., worst-case eavesdropping scenario (WcES)). Unlike
these studies, the authors in [20] have investigated the scenario
that the eavesdropper is affected by the interference generated
by superposed signals when carrying out a multi-user data
detection as discussed above. However, they have assumed
that the message of the user with high QoS is already decoded
successfully at the eavesdropper when analyzing the secrecy
performance of the user with low QoS. Meanwhile, [21] has
considered both transmission outage1 and secrecy outage for
analyzing the secrecy performance but only for the WcES
scenario. In fact, although the WcES is an effective approach
to characterize the secrecy performance, this can overestimate
the eavesdropper’s multi-user decodability.
Motivated by the aforementioned issues, in this paper, we
propose a new TAS-based2 secrecy communication protocol
1In a two-user NOMA system, the transmission outage occurs at the strong
user when it does not successfully decode the message of the weak user or
its own message.
2In our TAS method, only one antenna from multiple transmit antennas
is selected for transmissions. Choosing multiple antennas, which is more
challenging, will be an interesting problem to consider in future work.
for two-user3 MIMO NOMA networks over Nakagami-m
fading channels. It is assumed that maximal ratio combining
(MRC) is employed at the two LUs and the eavesdropper
to maximize the signal quality. On this basis, two solutions
of TAS to design a secure communication protocol, namely
Solutions I and II, are proposed to maximize the received
signal power at the near and far users, respectively. To analyze
the secrecy performance of the two solutions, we derived the
exact and approximate closed-form expressions of the SOP
for the two LUs and the overall system. Also, we provided the
asymptotic expressions for the SOP and investigate the secrecy
diversity. Moreover, we compare the secrecy performance in
various scenarios adopting the two solutions, such as SISO
versus MIMO, and compared our solutions with the previous
works [19]–[21] to evaluate the benefits of our proposed
protocol. Accordingly, to validate the analytical results, Monte
Carlo simulation was employed.
Therefore, the contributions of this paper can be summa-
rized as follows:
• We analyze the secrecy performance of the NOMA
network in which the impact of MIMO transmission,
Nakagami-m fading, and the eavesdropper’s multi-user
decodability on the system performance are addressed.
• We propose two new TAS protocols to improve the
security of the considered MIMO NOMA network.
• We derive exact closed-form expressions for the secrecy
outage probability (SOP) of the near user.
• We derive approximate closed-form expressions for the
SOP of the far user as well as for the overall network.
• We provide asymptotic expressions for the SOPs and a
secrecy diversity order analysis. Thus, we evaluate the
effects of various system parameters, such as average
transmit signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), the number of anten-
nas, power allocation coefficients, and fading parameters,
on the secrecy performance.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: The
system model is presented in Section II. The transmit antenna
selection scheme is described in Section III. The secrecy
performance analysis of the considered system is shown in
Section IV. The numerical results and discussions are depicted
in Section V. Finally, Section VI shows our conclusion.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a downlink MIMO NOMA network consisting of
a source (the base station) denoted by S, a near user denoted
by N , a far (cell edge) user denoted by F , and a passive
eavesdropper denoted by E, as depicted in Fig. 1. In this
system, the source S, the near user N , the far user F , and
the eavesdropper E are equipped with LS , LN , LF , and LE
antennas, respectively.
Let hUjSi (1 ≤ i ≤ LS , 1 ≤ j ≤ LU , U ∈ {N,F})
denote the channel fading coefficient from antenna i at S to
3In order to focus on designing a new secrecy communication protocol, a
two-user NOMA network is studied in this paper. In particular, our obtained
results can be easily used for further calculations in downlink NOMA systems
with multiple users (more than two users) by applying the hybrid multiple
access techniques (i.e., the combination between NOMA and conventional
OMA schemes) as studied in [24], [25].
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Fig. 1. System model for secure transmission in MIMO NOMA networks.
antenna j at U . Similarly, hEjSi (1 ≤ j ≤ LE) denotes the
channel fading coefficient from antenna i at S to antenna j at
E. In our work, the legitimate and eavesdropping channels are
modeled as mutually independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d) Nakagami-m fading channels with parameters mU and
mE , and squared means ΩU = E
[∣∣hUjSi ∣∣2] and ΩE =
E
[∣∣hEjSi∣∣2], respectively. In addition, the distance and path
loss exponent of the S → U and S → E channels are denoted
by dUS and θUS , and dES and θES , respectively.
Employing NOMA, S simultaneously communicates with
two LUs N and F . Further, S selects an antenna among LS
antennas to broadcast information to N and F by applying
a TAS technique. The antenna selection schemes will be
clarified in the next section. At the receiver side, maximal
ratio combining (MRC) is used at N , F , and E.
Suppose that antenna i at S is selected for transmission,
the channel power gain of the S → U link with MRC can be
expressed as
‖hUSi‖2 =
LU∑
j=1
∣∣hUjSi∣∣2, (1)
where hUSi ∈ CLU×1 denotes the channel coefficient vector
of the S → U link.
Given the above discussion, the overall communication
process of the system can be mathematically depicted as
follows. Following the principle of NOMA, S transmits the
superposed message x =
√
αNPSxN +
√
αFPSxF to N
and F , where xN and xF denote the intended messages for
N and F , respectively. Also αN and αF denote the power
allocation coefficients for N and F , respectively. Thus, the
received signal at U (U ∈ {N,F}) is given by
yUSi =
(√
αNPSxN +
√
αFPSxF
)
wUSihUSi + nUSi ,
(2)
where wUSi =
h†USi
‖hUSi‖ represents the signal processing opera-
tion at U with MRC, nUSi ∼ CN (0, N0) stands for an additive
white Gaussian noise (AWGN) at user U . According to the
principle of NOMA, we assume that ‖hNSi‖2 > ‖hFSi‖2,
αF > αN > 0 and αF +αN = 1. Therefore, the instantaneous
signal-to-interference-and-noise ratio (SINR) at F to detect xF
is
γxFFSi =
αF γ0‖hFSi‖2
αNγ0‖hFSi‖2 + 1
, (3)
where γ0 = PSN0 denotes the average transmit signal-to-noise
ratio (SNR) associated with the LUs.
At N , a SIC receiver is used to decode xF which is then
removed from the observation before detecting xN . Thus, the
instantaneous SINR at N to detect xF can be given by
γxFNSi =
αF γ0‖hNSi‖2
αNγ0‖hNSi‖2 + 1
, (4)
and the instantaneous SNR at N to detect xN is written as
γxNNSi = αNγ0‖hNSi‖
2
. (5)
At E, the signal received from S can be expressed as
yESi =
(√
αNPSxN +
√
αFPSxF
)
wESihESi + nESi ,
(6)
where wESi =
h†ESi
‖hESi‖ represents the signal processing
operation at E with MRC, nESi ∼ CN (0, NE) stands for
the AWGN at E. We assume that SIC receiver is applied at
E to decode xF , then subtract this element from the received
signal to detect xN . Thus, the instantaneous SINR at E to
detect xF can be expressed as
γxFESi =
αF γE‖hESi‖2
αNγE‖hESi‖2 + 1
, (7)
and the instantaneous SNR at E to detect xN is written as
γxNESi = αNγE‖hESi‖
2
, (8)
where γE = PSNE is the average transmit SNR associated with
E.
III. PROPOSED TAS PROTOCOL AND PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we propose two solutions, namely Solutions
I and II, for designing a TAS-based secure protocol for the
considered MIMO NOMA network. To do this, it is assumed
that the channel state information (CSI) of the legitimate
channels is available at S, whereas the eavesdropper’s CSI is
unknown at S [26], [27]. Furthermore, we assume that perfect
CSI4 is considered in this paper, as used in [13], [17]–[21].
A. Two Proposed TAS Solutions
For convenience, let Xi = ‖hFSi‖2, Yi = ‖hNSi‖2, and
Zi = ‖hESi‖2.
4In fact, the perfect CSI may be difficult to obtain due to the effect of
delay and time-varying of the wireless link [28]. This can be resolved by
investigating the imperfect CSI which is an interesting issue to analyze in
future work.
41) Solution I and Formulations of Legitimate Channels: In
solution I, an antenna at S is selected for transmission with
the aim of finding the best channel condition of the S → N
link.
Given this context, the selected antenna, denoted by iˆ, can
be mathematically represented as follows:
iˆ = arg max
1≤i≤LS
{Yi} . (9)
With this setting, the CDF of Yiˆ has the following form [13]
FYiˆ,I (x) =
(
1−
aN−1∑
k=0
mkN
k!λkNS
xke
−mNxλNS
)LS
, (10)
where aN = mNLN and λNS = ΩN
d
θNS
NS
.
With the aid of the binomial expansion given in [29,
Eq. 1.111] and using the multinomial theorem, (10) can be
rewritten as
FYiˆ,I (x) = 1 +
LS∑
p=1
∑
∆N=p
ΦNx
ϕN e
− pmNxλNS , (11)
where ∆N =
aN−1∑
q=0
δN,q, ϕN =
aN−1∑
q=0
qδN,q, and ΦN =(
LS
p
)
(−1)p
(
p
δN,0, ..., δN,aN−1
)[
aN−1∏
q=0
(
mqN
q!λqNS
)δN,q]
.
Moreover, the CDF of Xiˆ is given by [13]
FXiˆ,I (x) = 1−
aF−1∑
k=0
mkF
k!λkFS
xke
−mFxλFS , (12)
where aF = mFLF and λFS = ΩF
d
θFS
FS
.
2) Solution II and Formulations of Legitimate Channels: In
contrast to Solution I, in Solution II, an antenna at S is chosen
to broadcast information with the purpose of providing the
best channel gain of the S → F link. Accordingly, the chosen
antenna at S in this case can be expressed as
iˆ = arg max
1≤i≤LS
{Xi} . (13)
Thus, the CDF of Xiˆ can be given as
FXiˆ,II (x) = 1 +
LS∑
p=1
∑
∆F=p
ΦFx
ϕF e
− pmF xλFS , (14)
and the CDF of Yiˆ is
FYiˆ,II (x) = 1−
aN−1∑
k=0
mkN
k!λkNS
xke
−mNxλNS , (15)
where ∆F =
aF−1∑
q=0
δF,q, ϕF =
aF−1∑
q=0
qδF,q, and ΦF =(
LS
p
)
(−1)p
(
p
δF,0, ..., δF,aF−1
)[
aF−1∏
q=0
(
mqF
q!λqFS
)δF,q]
.
3) Formulations of Eavesdropping Channels: For E, the
PDF and the CDF of Ziˆ in both Solutions I and II are given
by [13]
fZiˆ (x) =
maEE x
aE−1
Γ (aE)λ
aE
ES
e
−mExλES , (16)
FZiˆ (x) = 1−
aE−1∑
k=0
mkE
k!λkES
xke
−mExλES , (17)
where aE = mELE and λES = ΩE
d
θES
ES
.
B. Preliminary Analysis of SINRs with Solutions I and II
From (12), (14), and (17), the closed-form expressions of
the CDF of γxFFSiˆ in Solutions I and II, and the PDF of γ
xF
ESiˆ
are derived in Proposition 1, Proposition 2, and Proposition 3,
respectively, as follows.
Proposition 1. Under Nakagami-m fading, the CDF of γxFFSiˆ
in Solution I has the following form
FγxFFS
iˆ
,I (x)
=

1, x ≥ β
1−
aF−1∑
k=0
1
k!λkFS
(
mFAx
γ0
)k
e
−mFAxγ0λFS , x < β ,
(18)
where Ax = xαF−αNx and β =
αF
αN
.
Proof: With the aid of (3), FγxFFS
iˆ
,I (x) is given by
FγxFFS
iˆ
,I (x) = Pr
(
αF γ0Xiˆ
αNγ0Xiˆ + 1
< x
)
=
{
1, x ≥ β
FXiˆ,I
(
Ax
γ0
)
, x < β
.
(19)
By substituting (12) into (19), (18) is obtained and the proof
is completed.
Proposition 2. Under Nakagami-m fading, the CDF of γxFFSiˆ
in Solution II is expressed as
FγxFFS
iˆ
,II (x)
=

1, x ≥ β
1 +
LS∑
p=1
∑
∆F=p
ΦF
(
Ax
γ0
)ϕF
e
− pmFAxγ0λFS , x < β .
(20)
Proof: Similar to the proof of Lemma 1, based on (3),
FγxFFS
iˆ
,II (x) can be represented as
FγxFFS
iˆ
,II (x) =
{
1, x ≥ β
FXiˆ,II
(
Ax
γ0
)
, x < β
. (21)
To this end, by substituting (14) into (21) to obtain (20), the
proof is completed.
Proposition 3. Under Nakagami-m fading, the PDF of γxFESiˆ
is given by
fγxFES
iˆ
(x)
=

0, x ≥ β
aE−1∑
k=0
mkEαFA
k−1
x e
− mEAx
γEλES
k!λkESγ
k
E(αF−αNx)2
(
mEAx
λESγE
− k
)
, x < β
.
(22)
5Proof: First, we derive the CDF of γxFESiˆ by using (7) as
follows:
FγxFES
iˆ
(x) =
{
1, x ≥ β
FZiˆ
(
Ax
γE
)
, x < β
. (23)
By substituting (17) into (23), FγxFES
iˆ
(x) is expressed as
FγxFES
iˆ
(x) =

1, x ≥ β
1−
aE−1∑
k=0
1
k!λkES
(
mEAx
γE
)k
e
− mEAxγEλES , x < β .
(24)
The PDF of γxFESiˆ is defined as
fγxFES
iˆ
(x) =
dFγxFES
iˆ
(x)
dx
. (25)
The final expression of fγxFES
iˆ
(x) in (22) is obtained by
deriving the derivative of FγxFES
iˆ
(x) in (24) with respect to
x. The proof is completed.
IV. SECRECY PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, to validate the two proposed solutions, the
secrecy performance regarding the SOP obtained at N and F ,
and the SOP of the overall system is analyzed.
A. Preliminary
This subsection presents the definitions of secrecy capacity
and SOP for secure communication in the considered MIMO
NOMA system.
First, let CU,i and CEU,i (U ∈ {N,F}) denote the capac-
ities of the S → U legitimate channel and the S → E
illegitimate channel to detect the signal xU , respectively. Thus,
according to [30], the secrecy capacity achieved at U can be
defined as
CS,i = max{0, CU,i − CEU,i}
= max
{
0, log2
(
1 + γxUUSi
1 + γxUESi
)}
,
(26)
where CU,i = log2
(
1 + γxUUSi
)
and CEU,i = log2
(
1 + γxUESi
)
.
Second, the SOP obtained at N is defined as
SOPN,i
= Pr
{
γxFNSi < γth
}
+ Pr
{
γxFNSi ≥ γth, γxFESi < γth, CN,i < Rs,N
}
+ Pr
{
γxFNSi ≥ γth, γxFESi ≥ γth, CS,i < Rs,N
}
,
(27)
where γth = 2RF −1 denotes the SNR threshold for correctly
decoding xF , RF represents the target data rate of F , and
Rs,N represents the secrecy rate threshold at N .
Remark 1. The definition of SOPN,i, given in (27), is differ-
ent from the previous works considering the scenario that N
and E are always successfully decoding the message of F , i.e.,
Pr
{
γxFNSi ≥ γth
}
= 1 [17]–[20] and Pr
{
γxFESi ≥ γth
}
= 1
[17]–[21].
To analyze the SOP at user N , its formulation needs to be
further expressed for more insights. Thus, according to (27),
SOPN,i can be expressed as in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4. From (27), the SOP at user N can be further
represented as
SOPN,i
= Pr
{
γxFNSi < γth
}︸ ︷︷ ︸
Θ1
+ Pr
{
γxFNSi ≥ γth, γxFESi < γth, CN,i < Rs,N
}︸ ︷︷ ︸
Θ2
+ Pr
{
γxFNSi ≥ γth, γxFESi ≥ γth, CS,i < Rs,N
}︸ ︷︷ ︸
Θ3
=
{
1, γth ≥ β
Λ1 + Λ2 + Λ3, γth < β
,
(28)
where Λ1, Λ2, and Λ3 are, respectively, given by
Λ1 = FYi
(
Aγth
γ0
)
,
Λ2 =

0, Rs,N < η[
FYi
(
γs,N
γ0
)
− FYi
(
Aγth
γ0
)]
×FZi
(
Aγth
γE
) , Rs,N > η ,
and
Λ3 =
∞∫
Aγth
γE
[
FYi
(
2Rs,N γEx+ γs,N
γ0
)
− FYi
(
Aγth
γ0
)]
fZi (x) dx,
where η = log2
(
αF
αF−αNγth
)
and γs,N = 2
Rs,N−1
αN
.
Proof: See Appendix A.
Third, the SOP at F has the following form
SOPF,i = Pr {CF,i − CEF,i < Rs,F }
=
∞∫
0
FγxFFSi
(gx,F ) fγxFESi
(x) dx,
(29)
where gx,F = 2Rs,F x + 2Rs,F − 1 and Rs,F represents the
secrecy rate threshold at F .
Fourth, in the system, we define the overall SOP as the
probability that the secrecy outage event occurs at either N or
F , i.e.,
SOPO,i = 1− (1− SOPF,i) (1− SOPN,i) . (30)
B. Secrecy Performance Analysis of Solution I
1) Secrecy Outage Probability Analysis: In this case, the
SOP at F and N are derived through Theorem 1 and Theorem
2 as follows.
Theorem 1. Under Nakagami-m fading, the SOP of user F
in Solution I is approximately expressed as
SOPF,I ≈ 1−
aF∑
m=0
aE∑
n=0
N∑
i=0
Ψ
(1)
F,IhF,I
[
(vi + 1)uF
2
]
, (31)
where Ψ(1)F,I =
piuFαFm
m
F m
n
E
√
1−v2i
m!n!2NλmFSλ
n
ESγ
m
0 γ
n
E
, vi =
cos
[
(2i−1)pi
2N
]
, uF = 1αN2Rs,F − 1, hF,I (x) =
6Amgx,F
An−1x
(αF−αNx)2 e
−mFAgx,Fγ0λFS −
mEAx
γEλES
(
mEAx
γEλES
− n
)
, gx,F =
2Rs,F x+ 2Rs,F −1, and N is a complexity-accuracy trade-off
parameter.
Proof: See Appendix B.
Theorem 2. Under Nakagami-m fading, the SOP of user N
in Solution I is given by
SOPN,I =
{
1, γth ≥ β
Λ1,I + Λ2,I + Λ3,I , γth < β
, (32)
where
Λ1,I = FYiˆ,I
(
Aγth
γ0
)
,
Λ2,I =

0, Rs,N < η[
FYiˆ,I
(
γs,N
γ0
)
− FYiˆ,I
(
Aγth
γ0
)]
×FZiˆ
(
Aγth
γE
) , Rs,N > η ,
Λ3,I = B
(1)
N,I +
∼∑
p,∆N ,m,n
ΨN,I
[
AγthB
(2)
N,I
γE
]n
e
−AγthB
(2)
N,I
γE ,
with FYiˆ,I (x) and FZiˆ (x) are defined in (11) and (17),
respectively. B(1)N,I =
[
1− FYiˆ,I
(
Aγth
γ0
)] [
1− FZiˆ
(
Aγth
γE
)]
,
B
(2)
N,I =
pmNγE2
Rs,N
γ0λNS
+ mEλES ,
∼∑
p,∆N ,m,n
=
LS∑
p=1
∑
∆N=p
ϕN∑
m=0
aE+m−1∑
n=0
, and ΨN,I =(
ϕN
m
)
ΦNΓ(aE+m)m
aE
E (2
Rs,N γE)
m
γ
ϕN−m
s,N e
− pmNγs,N
γ0λNS
n!Γ(aE)λ
aE
ESγ
ϕN
0
[
B
(2)
N,I
]aE+m .
Proof: See Appendix C.
From (30), the overall SOP of the system in Solution I is
expressed as
SOPO,I = 1− (1− SOPF,I) (1− SOPN,I) . (33)
2) Asymptotic Secrecy Outage Probability Analysis : Using
the series representation of ex given by [29, Eq. 1.211]
ex =
∞∑
k=0
xk
k!
, (34)
the asymptotic CDF of Xiˆ and Yiˆ when γ0 →∞ are written
as
FXiˆ,I (x) ≈
(mFx/λFS)
aF
(aF )!
, (35)
and
FYiˆ,I (x) ≈
[
(mNx/λNS)
aN
(aN )!
]LS
, (36)
respectively.
For F , according to Proposition 1, (29), and (35), after
some algebraic manipulations similar to the proof of Theorem
1 in Appendix B, its SOP in Solution I is asymptotically
approximated as
SOP asymF,I ≈
aE−1∑
m=0
N∑
i=0
ΨasymF,I h
asym
F,I
[
(vi + 1)uF
2
]
+
aE−1∑
m=0
ΨF,E ,
(37)
where ΨF,E =
mmEA
m
uF
e
−mEAuF
γEλES
m!γmE λ
m
ES
, ΨasymF,I =
piuFαFm
aF
F m
m
E
√
1−v2i
m!(aF )!2Nλ
aF
FSλ
m
ESγ
aF
0 γ
m
E
, and hasymF,I (x) =
A
aF
gx,F
Am−1x e
− mEAx
γEλES
(αF−αNx)2
(
mEAx
γEλES
−m
)
.
The secrecy diversity order at F in Solution I, DF,I , is
defined as [19]
DF,I = − lim
γ0→∞
log
[
SOP asymF,I (γ0)
]
log (γ0)
. (38)
By substituting (37) into (38), we have DF,I = 0.
For N , based on (28) and (36), and after some algebraic
manipulations similar to the proof of Theorem 2 in Appendix
C, the asymptotic SOP in Solution I is expressed as
SOP asymN,I =
{
1, γth ≥ β
Λasym1,I + Λ
asym
2,I + Λ
asym
3,I , γth < β
,
(39)
where
Λasym1,I ≈
1
[(aN )!]
LS
(
mNAγth
γ0λNS
)bN
,
Λasym2,I ≈

0, Rs,N < η
(mN/γ0λNS)
bN
[(aN )!]
LS
(
γbNs,N −AbNγth
)
×FZiˆ
(
Aγth
γE
) , Rs,N > η ,
Λasym3,I ≈ BasymN,I +
bN∑
m=0
aE+m−1∑
n=0
ΨasymN,I
(
mEAγth
γEλES
)n
e
−mEAγthγEλES ,
with BasymN,I =
(mNAγth/γ0λNS)
bN
[(aN )!]
LS
[
FZiˆ
(
Aγth
γE
)
− 1
]
,
ΨasymN,I =
(
bN
m
)
m
bN
N Γ(aE+m)γ
bN−m
s,N (2
Rs,N γE)
m
λmES
n!Γ(aE)[(aN )!]
LS (γ0λNS)
bNmmE
, and
bN = aNLS .
The secrecy diversity order at N in Solution I, DN,I , is
given by [19]
DN,I = − lim
γ0→∞
log
[
SOP asymN,I (γ0)
]
log (γ0)
=
{
0, γth ≥ β
bN , γth < β
.
(40)
Based on (30), the overall SOP in Solution I is asymptoti-
cally derived as
SOP asymO,I = 1−
(
1− SOP asymF,I
)(
1− SOP asymN,I
)
, (41)
and the achieved overall secrecy diversity order is [19]
DO,I = − lim
γ0→∞
log
[
SOP asymO,I (γ0)
]
log (γ0)
= 0. (42)
From the asymptotic and secrecy diversity order results, we
provide some useful insights through the following remarks.
Remark 2. In case of γth < β, the secrecy diversity order
of user N is mNLSLN . This reveals that Solution I can
offer the full secrecy diversity order. Moreover, the increase in
mN , LS , and LN can help improve the secrecy performance
of N . However, for the case of γth ≥ β, the zero secrecy
7diversity order for user N is obtained and hence its secrecy
performance is saturated as γ0 → ∞. In other words, the
secrecy performance of N does not depend on the system
parameters (i.e., LS , LN , and mN ) when γ0 →∞.
Remark 3. The secrecy diversity order is 0 for both user F
and the overall system in solution I. In other words, both user
F and the overall system reach a secrecy performance floor
in the high γ0 regime. Similar to Remark 2, this also indicates
that the secrecy performance of user F and the overall system
are not influenced by LS , LN , LF , mN , and mF in case of
γ0 →∞. This will be further clarified in section V.
C. Secrecy Performance Analysis of Solution II
1) Secrecy Outage Probability Analysis: In this case, the
SOP at F and N are derived through Theorems 3 and 4 as
follows.
Theorem 3. Under Nakagami-m fading, the SOP of F with
Solution II is approximately expressed as
SOPF,II ≈ 1 +
∼∑
p,∆F ,m,i
Ψ
(1)
F,IIhF,II
[
(vi + 1)uF
2
]
, (43)
where
∼∑
p,∆F ,m,i
=
LS∑
p=1
∑
∆F=p
aE∑
m=0
N∑
i=0
,
Ψ
(1)
F,II =
piuFΦFαFm
m
E
√
1−v2i
m!2Nγ
ϕF
0 γ
m
E λ
m
ES
, and hF,II (x) =
A
ϕF
gx,F
Am−1x
(αF−αNx)2 e
− pmFAgx,Fγ0λFS −
mEAx
γEλES
(
mEAx
γEλES
−m
)
.
Proof: The proof of this theorem is similar to the proof
of Theorem 1 in Appendix B, in which Proposition 2 is used
instead of Proposition 1.
Theorem 4. Under Nakagami-m fading, the SOP of N in the
case of Solution II is given by
SOPN,II =
{
1, γth ≥ β
Λ1,II + Λ2,II + Λ3,II , γth < β
, (44)
where
Λ1,II = FYiˆ,II
(
Aγth
γ0
)
,
Λ2,II =

0, Rs,N < η[
FY
iˆ
,II
(
γs,N
γ0
)
− FY
iˆ
,II
(
Aγth
γ0
)]
×FZ
iˆ
(
Aγth
γE
) , Rs,N > η ,
and
Λ3,II = B
(1)
N,II −
∼∑
m,n,p
ΨN,II
[
AγthB
(2)
N,II
γE
]n
e
−AγthB
(2)
N,II
γE ,
with B(1)N,II =
[
1− FYiˆ,II
(
Aγth
γ0
)] [
1− FZiˆ
(
Aγth
γE
)]
,
B
(2)
N,II =
mE
λES
+ mNγE2
Rs,N
γ0λNS
,
∼∑
m,n,p
=
aN−1∑
m=0
m∑
n=0
aE+n−1∑
p=0
,
FYiˆ,II (x) is defined in (15), and ΨN,II =(
m
n
)
mmNm
aE
E Γ(aE+n)γ
m−n
s,N (2
Rs,N γE)
n
e
−mNγs,N
γ0λNS
m!p!Γ(aE)λ
aE
ESλ
m
NSγ
m
0
[
B
(2)
N,II
]aE+n .
Proof: The proof of this theorem is similar to the proof
of Theorem 2 in Appendix C, in which FYiˆ,II (x) in (15) is
used instead of FYiˆ,I (x) in (11).
Based on (43) and (44), the overall SOP of the system in
the case of Solution II is given by
SOPO,II = 1− (1− SOPF,II) (1− SOPN,II) . (45)
2) Asymptotic Secrecy Outage Probability Analysis : Fol-
lowing the similar calculation steps as in IV-B2, with Solution
II, the asymptotic SOP of user F is approximated as
SOP asymF,II ≈
aE−1∑
m=0
N∑
i=0
ΨasymF,II h
asym
F,II
[
(vi + 1)uF
2
]
+
aE−1∑
m=0
ΨF,E ,
(46)
where ΨasymF,II =
piuFαF
√
1−v2i
m![(aF )!]
LS 2N
(
mF
γ0λFS
)bF (
mE
γEλES
)m
,
hasymF,II (x) =
(
mEAx
γEλES
−m
)
A
bF
gx,F
Am−1x e
− mEAx
γEλES
(αF−αNx)2 , and bF =
aFLS .
From (46), we conclude that the secrecy diversity order at
F in this case is DF,II = 0.
Next, the asymptotic SOP at N is given by
SOP asymN,II =
{
1, γth ≥ β
Λasym1,II + Λ
asym
2,II + Λ
asym
3,II , γth < β
,
(47)
where
Λasym1,II ≈
1
(aN )!
(
mNAγth
γ0λNS
)aN
,
Λasym2,II ≈

0, Rs,N < η
(mN/γ0λNS)
aN
(aN )!
FZ
iˆ
(
Aγth
γE
)
× (γaNs,N −AaNγth) , Rs,N > η ,
Λasym3,II ≈ BasymN,II +
aN∑
m=0
aE+m−1∑
n=0
ΨasymN,II
[
mEAγth
γEλES
]n
e
−mEAγthγEλES ,
with BasymN,II =
(mNAγth/γ0λNS)
aN
(aN )!
[
FZiˆ
(
Aγth
γE
)
− 1
]
, and
ΨasymN,II =
(
aN
m
)
m
aN
N Γ(aE+m)γ
aN−m
s,N (2
Rs,N γE)
m
λmES
n!(aN )!Γ(aE)(γ0λNS)
aNmmE
.
It is shown from (47) that the secrecy diversity order at user
N in the case of Solution II is obtained as
DN,II =
{
0, γth ≥ β
aN , γth < β
. (48)
From (46) and (47), the asymptotic overall SOP is given by
SOP asymO,II = 1−
(
1− SOP asymF,II
)(
1− SOP asymN,II
)
, (49)
and the achieved overall secrecy diversity order in this case is
DO,II = 0.
Remark 4. It is worth noting that Solution II provides the
secrecy diversity order mNLN (if γth < β) and 0 (if γth ≥ β)
for N . Thus, in this case, the secrecy performance of N does
not depend on LS . Also, it can be improved by increasing
mN and LN . Solution II also shows the zero secrecy diversity
order for both F and the overall system similar to Solution I.
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Fig. 2. SOPN v.s. γ0 with different values of γE , where mF = mN =
mE = 2, LS = LN = LE = 2, αF = 0.6, and αN = 0.4.
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Fig. 3. SOPF v.s. γ0 with different values of γE , where mF = mN =
mE = 2, LS = LF = LE = 2, αF = 0.6, and αN = 0.4.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this section, numerical results, in terms of the SOP, are
provided to evaluate the secrecy performance of our solutions
for designing a secure MIMO NOMA network.
Specifically, the SOP of F (i.e., SOPF ), N (i.e., SOPN ),
and the overall system (i.e., SOPO) are investigated for two
different TAS solutions (i.e., Solutions I and II). Without
loss of generality, it is assumed that the distance from S
to F is set to unity and N is located in between them.
Indeed, this setting has been widely used in the literature
[31], [32]. In more details, the coordinates of S, F , N ,
and E are (0,0.5), (1,0.5), (0.5,0.5), and (3,0), respectively.
Furthermore, the predetermined simulation parameters are set
as follows: the target data rate and the secrecy rate thresholds
RF = Rs,F = Rs,N = 0.5 (bps/Hz), the path-loss exponents
θFS = θNS = θES = 2. For the complexity-accuracy tradeoff
parameter N , we can define an its specific value to achieve
the expected analytical results [19], [33]. In this paper, we
use N = 100 for our analysis. Note that in the legends
of all obtained results, we use the following abbreviations:
Ana. stands for the analytical results, Asymp. denotes the
asymptotic results, and Sim. indicates the simulation results.
In Figs. 2, 3, and 4, we examine SOPN , SOPF , and
SOPO as a function of average transmit SNR for LUs (γ0)
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Fig. 4. SOPO v.s. γ0 with the different values of γE , where mF = mN =
mE = 2, LS = LF = LN = LE = 2, αF = 0.6, and αN = 0.4.
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Fig. 5. SOPN v.s. γ0 with different values of (LS ,LN ,LE ), where mF =
mN = mE = 2, αF = 0.6, αN = 0.4, and γE = 10 (dB).
with different values of γE . It is observed that the secrecy
performance evaluated at N , F and for the overall system
are significantly improved (i.e., SOPN , SOPF , and SOPO
decrease) when the higher values of γ0 and the smaller values
of γE are considered. Particularly, one can see that SOPF and
SOPO remain constant in the high γ0 regime, i.e., γ0 → ∞.
In other words, the secrecy performance obtained at F and
the secrecy performance of the overall system are saturated.
Then, this phenomenon confirms the calculation of the zero
secrecy diversity order for F and the overall system in both
Solution I and Solution II, as indicated in IV-B2 and IV-C2.
In order to study how using multiple antennas impacts
the secrecy performance, we investigate the variations of
SOPN , SOPF , and SOPO with respect to the different values
of the number of antennas at S, F , N , and E, denoted
by (LS ,LF ,LN ,LE), as illustrated in Figs. 5, 6, and 7,
respectively. Particularly, in the case of (LS ,LF ,LN ,LE) =
(1,1,1,1), Solutions I and II yield the same curves. In general,
it is visible that employing MIMO at the LUs improves the se-
crecy performance significantly. In addition, the more antennas
the eavesdropper has, the worse the security performance the
system is. More specific discussions regarding these figures
are following.
As observed in Fig. 5, decreasing in LE and increasing in
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Fig. 6. SOPF v.s. γ0 with different values of (LS ,LF ,LE ), where mF =
mN = mE = 2, αF = 0.6, αN = 0.4, and γE = 10 (dB).
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Fig. 7. SOPO v.s. γ0 with the different values of (LS ,LF ,LN ,LE), where
mF = mN = mE = 2, αF = 0.6, αN = 0.4, and γE = 10 (dB).
LN and LS positively effect the secrecy performance evaluated
at N . Furthermore, as shown in IV-B2 and IV-C2, the secrecy
diversity order at N are mNLNLS and mNLN for the case
of Solution I and Solution II (γth < β), respectively. In other
words, considering Solution I, a significant improvement of the
secrecy performance can be obtained by increasing mN , LN ,
and LS . However, accounting for Solution II, the improvement
can only occur by increasing mN and LN .
In Fig. 6, the SOPF decreases when LF and LS increase as
well as LE decreases. However, as mentioned earlier, in the
high γ0 regime, the secrecy performance at F achieves the
saturation which does not depend on the number of antennas
(i.e., LF and LS). This phenomenon is also observed when
considering the effect of (LS ,LF ,LN ,LE) on SOPO in Fig. 7.
Specifically, the overall secrecy performance can be improved
when LS , LF , and LN scale up or LE scales down in the low
and medium range of γ0. Moreover, in the high γ0 regime, LS ,
LF , and LN have no impact on SOPO and then the overall
system reaches a secrecy performance floor.
In NOMA systems, the secrecy performance depends on
the power allocation coefficients, i.e., αF and αN . Fig. 8 is
provided to clarify the effect of αF and αN on the secrecy
performance of the overall system, where αF > αN > 0 and
αN = 1 − αF . From this figure, one can see that there is a
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Fig. 8. SOPO v.s. αF , where mF = mN = mE = 2, LS = LF =
LN = LE = 2 and γ0 = γE = 10 (dB).
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pair of optimal values of αF and αN , denoted by (α∗F , α
∗
N ),
that maximizes the overall secrecy performance. This can be
explained by the fact that when αF increases within αF < α∗F ,
the secrecy performance of user F is improved significantly.
This leads to the improvement of the overall secrecy perfor-
mance. However, when αF increases within αF > α∗F , the
secrecy performance of user N decreases considerably due to
a significant reduction of αN . Hence, the loss of the overall
secrecy performance can be observed. Furthermore, this figure
shows that Solution II outperforms Solution I in terms of
the overall secrecy performance. Therefore, αF in Solution I
should be higher than in Solution II to obtain a better secrecy
performance. In this figure, (α∗F , α
∗
N ) is roughly equal to
(0.98, 0.02) for Solution I and (0.92, 0.08) for Solution II.
In Fig. 9, the effect of the fading parameters, i.e., mN , mF ,
and mE , on the overall secrecy performance is investigated. It
is recalled that Nakagami-m fading corresponds to Rayleigh
fading as m = 1, whereas it approximates Rician fading
with parameter K as m = (K + 1)2 / (2K + 1). We can
see from this figure that the improvement of the secrecy
performance is observed with the increases in mN and mF
and the decrease in mE . This can be explained by the fact
that a better legitimate channel quality and a worse illegitimate
channel quality are obtained when increasing mN and mF and
10
decreasing mE , respectively. In addition, Fig. 9 indicates that
mF has a stronger impact on the overall secrecy performance
than mN does.
In order to clarify the effectiveness of our proposed protocol,
the comparison between our protocol and conventional ones
given in [19]–[21], denoted by SOPO, is presented in Fig. 10.
Furthermore, the results regarding the WcES are provided in
the figure as a benchmark. It can be observed from Fig. 10
that in our proposed protocol, the WcES yields a significant
decrease in the secrecy performance. This is because the
eavesdropper has the ability of powerfully detecting multi-user
data without the interference in this case. Comparing with the
previous works [19]–[21], we obtain the following different
results:
• Our protocol gives a much better overall secrecy perfor-
mance, compared to the protocol in [19]. This can be ex-
plained by the fact that the solution in [19] overestimates
the eavesdropper’s multi-user decodability, in which the
eavesdropper can decode multi-user data streams without
the interference generated by superposed transmit signals.
This assumption may be a non-trivial task and hence leads
to a significant reduction of the secrecy performance.
Furthermore, it can be seen that with WcES, our protocol
and the method in [19] can obtain similar results.
• Fig. 10 shows that nothing of significance has changed
in the secrecy performance obtained from our protocol
and the method in [20]. However, our protocol brings
more practical and general insights. Specifically, the
assumption used in [19], [20] (i.e., the strong user always
successfully decodes the message of the weak user) is a
strong one and may be difficult to achieve in realistic
scenarios. Whereas, our protocol considers the realistic
case where the strong user could successfully or unsuc-
cessfully decode the message of the weak user to analyze
the secrecy performance.
• Our protocol achieves better secrecy performance than the
protocol in [21] since the solution in [21] still considered
WcES. Note that our protocol can achieve the results
similar to the solution in [21] in case of the WcES.
Besides, unlike the works [19]–[21] considering MISO sys-
tems and Rayleigh fading, our paper investigates the secrecy
performance of a more general NOMA system with MIMO
and Nakagami-m fading.
It is noteworthy from all results that the secrecy performance
at N is much better than that at F (i.e., SOPN is much less
than SOPF ). It can be explained by the fact that S → N link
has a better channel gain than S → F link does since N is
closer to S than F does. In addition, one can see that Solution
I brings a better secrecy performance for N over Solution
II, whereas Solution II offers a higher secrecy performance
for F than Solution I does. This can be explained according
to the principle of TAS solutions presented in Section III.
Taking the overall secrecy performance into account, it can be
evaluated that Solution II outperforms Solution I. This implies
guaranteeing the secure performance at F has a stronger
impact on the overall secrecy performance than that at N .
0 10 20 30 40 50
γ0 (dB)
10-2
10-1
100
SO
P O
Ana. Proposed protocol without WcES
Sim. Proposed protocol without WcES
Sim. Proposed protocol with WcES
Sim. Protocol in [19]
Sim. Protocol in [20]
Sim. Protocol in [21]
Fig. 10. Comparison of secure communication protocols with Solution I,
where mF = mN = mE = 2, αF = 0.6, αN = 0.4, γE = 10 (dB),
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VI. CONCLUSION
In this work, we considerd a two-user MIMO NOMA
network in the presence of an eavesdropper over Nakagami-
m channels. Accordingly, we proposed two TAS solutions to
design the secure communication protocol for the network. To
validate the solutions, we evaluated the secrecy performance
of the system by deriving the exact and asymptotic closed-
form expressions of the SOP at the LUs and the SOP of the
overall system. Numerical results demonstrated that increasing
the number of antennas at the source and the LUs enhances
the overall secrecy performance in the low and medium
ranges of the average transmit SNR values (γ0), however,
this has no impact on the performance when γ0 → ∞. In
addition, properly choosing αF and αN can yield a better
overall secrecy performance. Furthermore, our proposed proto-
col brings not only an improved secrecy performance but also
more practical and general insights, compared with previous
protocols. Interestingly, Solution II outperforms Solution I
regarding the secrecy performance even though they achieve
the same zero overall secrecy diversity order.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF EQUATION (28)
We rewrite Θ1, Θ2, and Θ3 in (28) as follows:
Θ1 = Pr {(αF − αNγth) γ0Yi < γth}
=
{
1, γth ≥ β
FYi
(
Aγth
γ0
)
= Λ1, γth < β
,
(50)
Θ2 = Pr {(αF − αNγth) γ0Yi ≥ γth,
(αF − αNγth) γEZi < γth, Yi < γs,N/γ0}
=

0, γth ≥ β
Pr
{
Yi ≥ Aγth
γ0
, Zi <
Aγth
γE
, Yi <
γs,N
γ0
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Λ2
, γth < β ,
(51)
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and
Θ3 =

0, γth ≥ β
Pr
{
Yi ≥ Aγthγ0 , Zi ≥
Aγth
γE
,
Yi <
2Rs,N γEZi+γs,N
γ0
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Λ3
, γth < β .
(52)
To calculate Λ2, we observe that if
Aγth
γ0
>
γs,N
γ0
or Rs,N < η then Λ2 = 0, otherwise, Λ2 =
Pr
{
Aγth
γ0
≤ Yi < γs,Nγ0 , Zi <
Aγth
γE
}
. By using the definition
of the CDF, Λ2 is expressed as
Λ2 =

0, Rs,N < η[
FYi
(
γs,N
γ0
)
− FYi
(
Aγth
γ0
)]
×FZi
(
Aγth
γE
) , Rs,N > η ,
(53)
Regarding Λ3, we observe that if
2Rs,N γEZi+γs,N
γ0
<
Aγth
γ0
or Zi <
Aγth−γs,N
2Rs,N γE
then Λ3 = 0, otherwise,
Λ3 = Pr
{
Aγth
γ0
≤ Yi < 2
Rs,N γEZi+γs,N
γ0
, Zi ≥ AγthγE
}
. Since
Aγth−γs,N
2Rs,N γE
<
Aγth
γE
, ∀γth < β, hence Λ3 is given by
Λ3 =
∞∫
Aγth
γE
[
FYi
(
2Rs,NγEx+ γs,N
γ0
)
− FYi
(
Aγth
γ0
)]
× fZi (x) dx.
(54)
From (50) to (54), SOPN,i is obtained as in (28) and the proof
is completed.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
By using Proposition 1, FγxFFS
iˆ
,I (gx,F ) is expressed as
FγxFFS
iˆ
,I (gx,F )
=

1, x ≥ uF
1−
aF−1∑
k=0
1
k!λkFS
(
mFAgx,F
γ0
)k
e
−mFAgx,Fγ0λFS , x < uF
.
(55)
Based on Proposition 3 and (55), SOP of user F in (29)
can be rewritten as
SOPF,I =
aE−1∑
k=0
mkEαF
k!λkESγ
k
E
β∫
0
Ak−1x e
− mEAx
γEλES
(αF − αNx)2
(
mEAx
λESγE
− k
)
dx
−
aF−1∑
m=0
aE−1∑
n=0
αFm
m
Fm
n
E
m!n!λmFSλ
n
ESγ
m
0 γ
n
E
uF∫
0
hF,I (x) dx
= 1−
aF−1∑
m=0
aE−1∑
n=0
αFm
m
Fm
n
E
m!n!λmFSλ
n
ESγ
m
0 γ
n
E
uF∫
0
hF,I (x) dx,
(56)
where, (56) is obtained by the fact that uF ≤ β, ∀Rs,F ≥ 0
and hF,I (x) =
Amgx,F
An−1x
(αF−αNx)2 e
−mFAgx,Fγ0λFS −
mEAx
γEλES
(
mEAx
γEλES
− n
)
.
Note that it is challenging to resolve the integral in (56), hence
an approximation solution is proposed by using the Gaussian-
Chebyshev quadrature [34] as follows:
uF∫
0
hF,I (x) dx ≈ piuF
2N
N∑
i=0
hF,I
[
(vi + 1)uF
2
]√
1− v2i .
(57)
By substituting (57) into (56), SOPF,I is obtained as in (31).
The proof of Theorem 1 is completed.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
From (28), SOP of user N in Solution I is expressed as
in (32), in which Λ1,I and Λ2,I is obtained by substituting
FYiˆ,I (x) in (11) and FZiˆ (x) in (17) into Λ1 and Λ2 in (28).
To derive Λ3,I , we rewrite Λ3,I by substituting FYiˆ,I (x) in
(11) and fZiˆ (x) in (16) into Λ3 in (28) as follows:
Λ3,I =
[
1− FY
iˆ
,I
(
Aγth
γ0
)][
1− FZ
iˆ
(
Aγth
γE
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
(1)
N,I
+
LS∑
p=1
∑
∆N=p
ΦNm
aE
E
Γ (mELE)λ
aE
ES
∞∫
Aγth
γE
(
2Rs,N γEx+ γs,N
γ0
)ϕN
× xaE−1e−
pmN
(
2
Rs,N γEx+γs,N
)
γ0λNS
−mEx
λES dx.
(58)
By applying binomial expansion for
(
2Rs,NγEx+ γs,N
)ϕN
and upper incomplete Gamma function [29, Eq. 8.350.2] into
(58), Λ3,I is obtained as in (32). The proof of Theorem II is
completed.
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